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So I Guess It's Not News...

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I learned, via cryptogon, of a recent attempt by two Japanese nationals to creep into Switzerland via Italy. This wouldn't have been that strange, except they were carrying $134 billion (with a b) in possibly counterfeit US Government securities.

It gets even crazier. The securities are in denominations that are not available to ordinary human beings in the private market. Some of these bonds are available only to states and carry billion-dollar denominations.

So, if they're real, this is a pretty big deal. Italy gets a finder's fee and the private market becomes aware that the Japanese government or some other nation-state actor (the only people who could get these things) want to do something with their US government debt holdings.

If they're fake, it's even more interesting. Though it's of course fascinating to surmise that foreign governments are dumping US Treasuries, what about the supposition that there might be in circulation a quantity at least as large as $134 Billion in fake Treasury obligations? Obligations so realistic as to be indistinguishable for 7 days to Italian authorities? This story came out there in a press release dated June 4.

An Open Data Source for Risk Analysis

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I was delighted to learn somebody is trying to create a new, open-source model for producing opinions on creditworthiness. Any attempt to replace broken credit rating agencies as decision makers for who receives capital should be greeted as a wholly welcome step.

Freerisk is not yet - and does not seem to hope to be - a replacement for rating agencies in their entirety. It is instead a way to lever individual analysts by allowing them to query across a wide range of SEC filings at once using a relatively simple language called SPARQL. In addition, it provides a framework for people to share insights from these statements with each other. In time, the creators hope to move to a more user-friendly way of getting data from their database (which is wonderful).

The creators are toying with the ability to include comments and insights from footnotes into standard query data in hopes of creating a fuller picture from a standard query.

A great potential "value add" for this comes in the example of highlighting an interesting footnote. Having read company filings, I can attest that a great deal of their footnotes are pretty boring. There are occasional gems contained therein which make the process worthwhile, but wouldn't it be nice if there was a way to get quickly to the interesting ones?

The difficulty that Freerisk and other projects like it will face in replacing credit rating agencies is that consumers have come accustomed to regarding credit simply: as a letter. There will always be a market for the distillation of knowledge that can be gathered off of a platform like Freerisk into a format that allows for simple, "thumbs up/thumbs down" evaluation.

If anything, I think Freerisk is simply an excellent substitute for certain functions of a Bloomberg terminal for people willing to learn a Query language (not many). It's nice to see so much data opening up for public consumption, especially with the ability to share relevant insights on a public forum.

A conversational approach to financial journalism

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Minyanville.com helped make it possible for me to be conversant about finance. I remember discovering the site about two weeks into my first internship on Wall Street; I had been tasked with monitoring a status screen and told to continually read the news to help my own understanding. When I first started reading the news on traditional channels like the New York Times business section and Reuters financial news, I felt like I was drowning.

I found Minyanville by chance, and found Todd Harrison's writing there to be immensely helpful to my understanding. At first it was just his writing, but as I started exploring the site I found a collection of writers ("Professors" in Minyanspeak) who have devoted themselves to the craft of finance and are willing to share their experiences.

Imagine me, eighteen years old, essentially dropping in and listening to a collection of the "cool kids" in the finance world talk about their craft with one another and an audience of thousands. I was given the opportunity to both sit down with and chat over the phone with Todd (Toddo) recently, and he shared with me some musings about how Minyanville fits in with the world and how the world fits in with the financial media. 

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Minyanville is a finance website built in a new way: with education at its core. Toddo characterizes his experience landing on the derivatives desk at Morgan Stanley rather simply: "I got a Black-Scholes model and a Wall Street Journal and they said, you know, 'here you go'." That experience, to him was "the genesis of understanding that there was a void in the marketplace."

Minyanville has been actively trying to fill that void. One can tell from the way that writers are referred to as "professors" that education is a high priority. There is a wide range of content on the non-degree granting University of Minyanville website aimed at college students looking to expand their awareness.

The content is not organized in a quiz-and-lecture format, which allows students to access the material in a very nonconventional way. This is consistent with an ongoing theme in Minyanville; as Harrison puts it: "The industrial revolution part deux, it's really the need for pretty much every sector in the marketplace, whether it's finance, whether it's media, whether its education, whether it's philanthropy...to reinvent their model."

It's not hard to see how trying to integrate the UMV content into a classroom might lead a professor to examine his model to better serve his students. UMV serves as a great way to "bring reality into the classroom", while simultaneously making sure that students understand that they are reading the opinions of fallible humans rather than the "truth" or the infallible advice of market gods.

The Minyanville approach of providing opinion rather than advice comes clear after I ask Toddo if anyone actually understands the financial machination. He responds "To understand where we are we must appreciate how we got here. So I think that looking at the probability spectrum of what could occur and communicating the risks and rewards to all of the scenarios within a probability spectrum and offering an opinion in the context that it's just that (an opinion) is the greatest value add in the market place, as opposed to telling people what to do."

Indeed many have long been critical of those who offer advice to random audiences rather than opinions. In person, it's clear that Harrison believes there's very little merit in offering advice over the internet, since there is absolutely no way he could know the risk profile of his readership. Further to the point of offering advice without information he offers "I think that's endemic of the mindset that got us into trouble in the first place."

Harrison offers that people should re-examine who they look to for their punditry, arguing that "Many of the pundits that people are looking to for questions on when we're going to get out of this are the same people who didn't see I coming in the first place." This jives very well with a thought passed on by a friend in the asset management industry who offered that oftentimes, once people are validated as pundits in the media mainstream that it's very difficult to get rid of them. Indeed pundits who offered up investment recommendations that failed miserably one month are often back the next recommending new investments with little accountability for their past failings.

On the subject of criticizing unaccountable pundits, there's not much more I can offer. There's already a closet industry built around criticizing CNBC. A point Toddo raises which I think is very thoughtful is that "There is a fair amount of culpability that extends throughout the societal spectrum. (It ranges) from the consumers who overextended on their credit to the financial institutions that engineered the markets to the policymakers who were complicit by acceptance to the CEO of the United States of America." He adds "Nobody was asking questions when the screens were green."

Harrison is hesitant to point out that he and many other Minyans were asking questions when the screens were green. It's been a good thing for me to have these guys as teachers, and to have their thoughts percolating in my brain as I attempt to make sense of the world. I truly hope that Minyanville is representative of a trend in financial journalism, and that more seasoned pros will begin coming out of the woodwork to add valuable perspective and commentary to a confusing world. 

It's always interesting to hear people talk about how there is some massive conspiracy at work whenever a significant event occurs...the fact of the matter is that (as shown below by the wonderful comic strip courtesy of XKCD) most of the time these are simply exercises searching for confirming evidence and ignoring that which is contradictory.

The argument that has been advanced (notably by Barry Ritholtz of the Big Picture) that Goldman Sachs somehow orchestrated a transfer of wealth from taxpayers to corporations strictly to take their money seems laughable without proof. To point to the Goldman Sachs pedigree of many treasury officials as proof is (as noted in the comic below) taking confirmation bias to all new levels. 

We can debate the merits of the bailout all day. We will likely agree that it was a fiscally and morally bankrupting exercise in confusing activity with progress. We should probably swap jokes sometime about how ridiculous it is for the management of a company to be raising money strictly to pay its executives, but I think it's just a step too far to assume they were coordinating effectively a theft without first proving it beyond the fact that many treasury officials knew each other.

I suspect Paulson, Kashkari, et al at the treasury are fundamentally good guys trying to do the taxpayer a service. The problem is that they didn't know how. In investigating conspiracy theories, it might first be salient to investigate reality theories. One such reality theory is this: our government is run by people who don't understand finance.

(The right side of the comic is cut off, so click on it to open it up in a pop-up.)

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I fatefully received David Einhorn's book, fooling some of the people all of the time, in the middle of my midterms week. There is nothing more potentially dangerous than having a thought provoking, extracurricular activity during one of the more critical periods of the school year.

In the book, Mr. Einhorn describes his conflict with a publicly traded company: Allied Capital. Allied is a business development corporation that purports to be in the business of giving loans to small businesses. The company is essentially a flow-through entity which passes investment income and capital gains directly to their shareholders. Essentially, it is a body of investments very similar in structure to a closed end fund.

He details how management used obfuscation, misrepresentation, and imprecise language to effectively flaunt the investor community and damage our markets. His experience with allied makes me wonder If I should broaden the definition of "Financial Journalism" as I investigate it.

Similar to John Edwards' "Two Americas" and my dad's "Three Americas" arguments, I am beginning to think that that metaphor can be perhaps used to represent the distinctions between what I view as distinct varieties of journalism...I will begin publishing entries describing each in detail, but I think I will start (hopefully) with a description of how Mr. Einhorn is very similar to a personality journalist, and how the hedge fund industry is similar to the blogosphere. More to come soon...

I was privileged to "speak" recently with Tim Rayment, an independent trader and freelance journalist who has written articles for the Sunday Times of London. He has written articles on a wide range of subjects, including a recent one about the nature of hedge fund managers and a fascinating piece of investigative journalism in which he examines a confidence scheme.

I particularly like his ideas about involving former professionals (hedgies and bankers) in journalism to inform and educate the public about the true nature of our financial economy.

By the way of context, the first question relates to an anecdote Tim shared with me about informally advising an actress on when to swap currencies while she sold a house in France and bought one in England, and the moments of euphoria and despair that she experienced while that trade was happening.

And now on to the interview...

To look at the example of the actress that you mentioned, it seems as if there doesn't seem to be much of anything that can get her to look at news rationally except for somehow making her into some form of trader. Is doing this as simple as involving former bankers and hedgers in the news media, or are there other steps that you would recommend be taken?

Turning her into a trader wasn't difficult. I told her how she would feel before she felt it. I explained that the panic she would experience in a few days' time was part of the process by which markets work, and that she had to endure feeling sick with anxiety before she could be rewarded with higher prices -- and that there was another actress, or at least another human being, who was going through the same emotions in mirror image while trying to achieve the opposite transaction, i.e., one who wished to sell a house in England and to buy one in France, while our actress wished to buy a house in England and sell one in France. The actress panicked when she was supposed to, despite being prepared for what would happen. But she trusted the explanation enough to wait. Each day I gave her price levels that would mean all was well, and price levels that would mean all was not. She watched the markets on her laptop, not daring to go out. In the end, I think she actually enjoyed the experience, because it gave her an understanding and a feeling of control. And she got her price.

As a follow up, how might one avoid the "Cramer Problem", where a former hedge fund manager makes the transition to being a journalist, but gives wide-ranging advice that is more designed to entertain than enlighten? Do journalistic organizations seeking to overcome this problem simply need to ignore the "Mad Money" audience? Can they do this and remain solvent?

 

I can't speak for CNBC, but in British broadsheet newspapers, the desire to entertain has been met in more wholesome ways. The Money section of The Sunday Times, for example, probably gives as much space to publicising the scams of banks and of financial companies as it does to investment themes, so that the reader is "entertained" by being made to feel angry. Arguably there is a strong public-interest justification in these stories. This is not a phenomenon of the credit crisis, by the way: the Money section, which -- unlike the Business section -- is aimed at a general audience, has always been quite sceptical. It's probably one-third to one-half investment advice, and one-third consumer advice, while a sixth of the section entertains readers by, for example, interviewing a celebrity about the most satisfying moments and the biggest mistakes in their personal finances. There's also a columnist who is mean with money, and happens to be married to someone he loves but regards as profligate. He's always saving cash; she's always spending it. It's quite funny.

Coming from the standpoint of protecting investors from hazy information that they might receive, could you support conceptually the establishment of a test to see who was capable of trading individual stocks and bonds (as distinct from vanilla mutual funds)? Can you think of anything that you would want to put on such a test?

Such a test might have perverse consequences. If you require people to pass a test before they can trade, you drive them into the arms of professionals, who might perform no better (but charge fees for the privilege). For those who pass the test, the danger is false confidence. Where would you draw the line? Would you ask a tenant to pass a test before allowing them to buy a house, for example?

I can see a case for requiring a test before trading on margin, however. It's leverage that destroys lives.

Is improving the quality of financial journalism more a question of improving the quality of reportage at the highest levels by involving experts or instead one of improving the level of discourse at the lowest level to educate a greater number of market participants? If you were the editor of a business section and had to choose which of these two to emphasize, which would it be? Why?

It would be both. I'd start by hiring reporters who understand companies, economies and the markets. Without that, you've got no business section and without a business section you don't have a proper newspaper. So, an editor has to give that priority. Then I'd establish a separate section, similar to the Sunday Times Money section, to educate the widest audience. By having two sections, you can publish material for a sophisticated audience in the Business section without intimidating the general audience. The two constituencies are equally important. Finally, I'd save some money from my budget to hire hedgies and ex-bankers as business columnists. These are columnists, not reporters. If there were no money left in the pot, I'd persuade them to do it for nothing (but they would not be allowed to "talk their book"). Their job is to educate the sophisticated audience (in the Business, not the Money section) with real-time analysis from a trader's viewpoint, because traders think differently from reporters.

When you were a "budding" trader, how did you navigate the transition from amateur to professional? What resources did you utilize? Are there ways you can conceive of to make these resources publicly available?

That's a long story. There are thousands of legitimate ways to trade, and would-be traders face a quest to find what is right for them. In the end, I took some academic work from the 1930s, which I came across by chance, and combined it with profit-driven work on technical analysis in the 1990s. Then I adapted both to suit the way my mind works. Much of the trading literature remains useful for generations, because it is not really about trading at all. It's about human nature, which does not change.

Trading is mostly control of your own psychology. And I've spent thousands of hours working out how to reduce the subjective to the binary, so that decisions can be as objective as possible.

I've also been very lucky in that I have good mentors. My advice would be to find good mentors and to do your best to outgrow them. At the same time, try to remove all ego from the trading process.

There's valuable work in the trading literature, but you need to overcome human frailty to use it. That's a lifelong task

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